Contradictions in Frontex Operations: the Push-back = Ellentmondások a Frontex műveletekben: a push-back (Visszaszorítás) by Vít, Michal & Kemény, Gábor
85
Magyar Rendészet  2020/4. 85—92. DOI:  10.32577/mr.2020.4.5
Contradictions in Frontex Operations: 
the Push-back
Michal VÍT1 — Gábor KEMÉNY2
The aim of the paper is to introduce the legal misfits between the standards 
of human rights as stated by the European Union and the Council of Europe 
and practical day to day experience related to EU Member States. For 
this purpose, the article focuses on political and legal assessment of the 
so-called pushbacks at the Greek–Turkish external border and introduces the 
influencing factors, such as the various interpretations of the legislation, or 
differences in the organisational structure and values. The authors conclude 
that these factors are endangering the fulfilment of the fundamental rights 
and the efficiency of the border protection, thus the security of the EU and 
its Member States.
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1. Introduction
The issue of protection of the EU’s external border has been a  matter of extensive 
focus from politicians, academics and practitioners since the beginning of the 
migration crisis of  2015 and  2016. These discussions have been dealing mainly with 
the following issue: how to make the system of border protection more efficient 
without significant redefinition of institutional structure of cooperation between the 
European Commission and EU member states? As we argue bellow, this task is very 
hard to be fulfilled due to growing lack of trust among EU Member States, which makes 
the EU – in this context the Frontex agency – paralysed in terms of compliance with 
political motivations and respecting the rule of law of the EU. Analysing the aims of 
strengthening the capacity of Frontex agency, we identify some weak points that are 
discussed below. Firstly, EU Member States are increasingly reluctant to respect the EU 
legal framework when it comes to the border protection, and consequently, operational 
implications of the Frontex agency. Secondly, there is a question of political and legal 
implications of the deployment of Frontex outside of the territory of the EU.
Analysing the experience of Frontex from its mission, it shows a complex pattern 
including security, humanity, and respect to rule of law. In spring  2020 the case of 
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the Danish police patrol illustrated the practical impact of blurred responsibility as 
well as a missing guiding framework. According to Politico.eu,3 a Danish patrol refused 
to follow the order of Greek police not to provide help to migrants who were just 
attempting to enter the EU on sea. The Greek police requested to push the migrant 
boat out of EU (Greek) waters, which the Danish patrol refused to do. According to 
them, such a behaviour has been outside the Frontex mandate and is not in line with 
EU Fundamental Rights as well as with findings of Fundamental Rights Agency. This 
very case is only one of many examples where there is a significant mismatch between 
EU fundamental rights and operational practice in the field. This event shows the 
significant limits in protecting the EU’s external border five years after the emergence 
of the migration crisis in  2015 and  2016. As discussed by many experts, such as Sergio 
Carrera,4 there is a divergence between the rule of law set by the EU and the Council of 
Europe enforced by EU institutions and agencies, and the security measures introduced 
and implemented by EU Member States. 
Of similar perspectives of questionable efficiency and legitimacy of the EU’s 
external border protection is the case of the Croatian–Bosnian border.5 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – particularly Una-Sana Canton – has become an attractive spot in  2018 
due to the need to find new means of getting to the EU, and the fragile political situation 
in Bosnia served as an excuse to avoid direct institutional and political responsibility. 
Croatia is not a member of the Schengen area and therefore Croatia is responsible for 
the system of border between Croatia and Bosnia. Coordination with other EU member 
states and the European Commission is based primarily on exchange of information on 
the number of illegal entries of third country nationals and asylum seekers, and/or the 
number of returns. However, Croatia aims to become part of the Schengen area most 
likely in  2020.6 This decision is of purely political nature, since it requires agreement of 
all EU Member States when it comes to voting at the Council of the EU. That said, the 
membership is a result of political bargaining in which Croatia needs to be perceived 
as able to provide effective protection of the EU’s external border. In this context, 
Croatian authorities acknowledged the existence of push-back to Bosnian territory 
without adequate registration and cooperation with Bosnian colleagues.7
3 Laurie Tritschler, ‘Danish boat in Aegean refused order to push back rescued migrants’, Politico,  06. 03. 2020. Available: 
www.politico.eu/article/danish-frontex-boat-refused-order-to-push-back-rescued-migrants-report/ (25. 11. 2020.)
4 Sergio Carrera, ‘The EU Border Management Strategy: FRONTEX and the Challenges of Irregular Immigration in the 
Canary Islands’, CEPS Working Document, no.  261,  2007.
5 Michal Vít and Gábor Kemény, ‘External EU Border Protection: who is doing what?’ Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Sarajevo, 
 2019. Available: https://ba.boell.org/en/2019/11/21/external-eu-border-protection-who-doing-what (25. 11. 2020.) 
6 ‘Croatia ready to join border-free Schengen area, EU Commission says’, Reuters,  22. 10. 2019. Available: www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-croatia-eu-schengen/croatia-ready-to-join-border-free-schengen-area-eu-commission-says-
idUSKBN1X11R1 (25. 11. 2020.)
7 Srdjan Govedarica, ‘Vermisst, vergessen, unbeachtet’, ARD-Current / Tagesschau.de,  25. 03. 2019. Available: www.
tagesschau.de/ausland/balkanroute-141.html (25.  11.  2020.); ‘Desperate journeys: Refugee and migrant children 
 arriving in Europe and how to strengthen their protection’, UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees,  2019. Available: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/71703Uni (25. 11. 2020.)
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1.1. EU versus Member States
This shows that the relationship between the EU and its Member States was influenced 
by the migration crisis mostly as a result of two factors. The first is the regular business, 
which includes dealing with the migrants flows by providing housing, health and legal 
assistance. The second one is the assistance provided to national authorities within EU 
and non-EU countries on the field of border management. Although capable control of the 
external borders has become an important topic for both the EU and its Member States 
since the outbreak of the migration crisis in  2015, the realisation of an efficient border 
management has been blocked by the conflicting aims of the European Commission 
and the EU Member States. At the same time, the area of border protection remained 
the competence of the Member States, where the European Commission can only play 
a coordinative role.8
This again highlighted the intergovernmental nature of the Schengen cooperation, 
which generates a complex institutional and political structure on the field of external 
border protection. This structure lets the Member States to act according to their national 
interest instead of coordinated EU policies. The main challenge during the implementation 
of the Schengen Borders Code comes from the intergovernmental nature of border 
management. The Code does not regulate the cooperation with third countries, which is 
an essential element of the efficient border protection. For this reason, cooperation with 
non-EU countries mostly depends on the political will of the neighbouring countries, 
which is articulated in the bilateral agreements. These agreements are outside of the legal 
framework of the EU by nature and therefore result in a limited control and transparency 
on behalf of the EU.9
2. Legal aspects
This opens the very important issue of analysing impacts of migration crisis in the 
Balkans. Namely, what are the side effects of tough border regime on Schengen and EU 
border? Since asylum seekers have only limited prospect to get to their destination legally 
and since there is only limited interest to apply EU coordinated asylum and migration 
policy, it creates tension alongside the EU external border. As a result, representatives of 
law enforcement agencies of individual Member States do not experience a coordinated 
approach by EU authorities as they are practitioners of the EU’s dysfunctional policy 
coordination. Said that, the main problem is thus a  very vaguely defined cooperation 
among EU and national authorities towards external border protection. It is a result of 
non-existing integrated and enforced EU border protection regime that would provide 
comprehensive approach also towards asylum and migration policies. Since there is no 
8 ‘Vít and Kemény, ‘External EU Border Protection’.
9 Gábor Kemény, ‘The present and the future of cross border police and customs information exchange between the EU 
and the Western Balkan region’, Public Security and Public Order  20 (2018),  126.
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possibility to enforce EU regulation by the Court of Justice of the European Union, the 
jurisdiction remains in full responsibility of the Member States. The EU’s main legal 
regulation, the Schengen Borders Code,10 is part of the legislation of all EU member states 
as a harmonised legislation without supranational control of the Court of Justice of the 
EU. Therefore, it implies that EU Member States will follow the similar track of practice 
when applying international regulations for the protection of refugees and persons 
requesting international protection.11 Thus, it opens space for extensive politisation of 
the border management issues. This is illustrated by the case ‘M. H. versus Croatia’ dealing 
with the incident on the Serbian–Croatian border in November  2017.  The Croatian 
authorities have refused to investigate the case of a girl deadly hit by train on Croatian 
territory and pushed back the family to Serbia without any legal and health assistance. 
The turbulent situation is a result of lacking transparent legal and political framework 
when it comes to communicating of EU priorities. Considering that we are speaking 
about countries that want to join EU and about external borders of the EU, this generates 
consequences for the rule of law in the region as well as the image of the EU as such. This 
practice has been matter of attention of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe stating the following: 
‘As these practices are widespread, and in some countries systematic, these »push-
backs« can be considered as part of national policies rather than incidental actions. The 
highest risk attached to pushbacks is the risk of refoulement, meaning that a person is 
sent back to a place where they might face persecution in the sense of the  1951 United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,12 or inhuman or degrading tre-
atment in the sense of the European Convention on Human Rights.’13
Based on the above, one can identify these challenges when it comes to lack of con-
sistency between operational practice and EU/international legal framework. There is 
a significant lack of strategy from the EU when it comes to harmonisation of opera-
tional practice with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. However, according to 
the Lisbon Treaty, neither the European Commission nor the Court of Justice of the EU 
has the competence to enforce the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Given the nature of 
the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, the EU lacks law enforcement mechanism 
in this policy area. This means that the European Court on Human Rights (ECHR), 
being outside the EU’s standing structure, has no legal – and political –  jurisdiction. 
Only EU Member States are included in the ECHR’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the en-
forcement of the court’s decision only relies on the political will of the state. Going back 
to the operational practice of Frontex, this blurred environment is defined as follows. 
10 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of  15 March  2006 establishing a Commu-
nity Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code). Official Journal of 
the European Union. Available: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32006R0562&f-
rom=HU (25. 11. 2020.), Art.  3.
11 Carrera, ‘The EU Border Management Strategy’.
12 The Refugee Convention,  1951. United Nations. Available: www.unhcr.org/4ca34be29.pdf (25. 11. 2020.)
13 ‘Pushback policies and practice in Council of Europe member States (Resolution  2299/2019)’, Parliamentary Assembly, 
 2019. Available: http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=28074 (25. 11. 2020.), Para  1.
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‘In case of violations of human rights or international protection obligations that are 
serious or likely to persist, the agency’s Executive Director should suspend or termi-
nate such operations’, in line with Article  46 of the Frontex regulation.14 However, this 
is in sharp contrast with the practice on the EU’s external border as well as with the 
legal and political lessons learned from  2015 and  2016 when the migration flows rea-
ched its peak.15 As the numerous evidences of push-backs show, it is extremely difficult 
to enforce international human rights regulations even if our EU institutions openly 
address the requested modus operandi. It is a  clear evidence of strong political inf-
luence over law enforcement that is at the same time without clear jurisdiction on the 
EU level (with regard to fundamental rights.)
3. Operational aspects
As it was detailed above, border management is a shared responsibility of Frontex and 
the Member States.16 This shared responsibility means that the primary responsibility of 
managing the external borders lies with the Member States, while the agency is supporting 
the efforts of the national authorities by facilitating the application of the EU’s border 
management measures. Frontex currently provides this support mainly by seconded 
team members from the Member States. These officers have a ‘dual responsibility’, they 
are responsible both to their home organisation and to Frontex during the operations, 
and they also work under the command and control of the hosting country.17
As a novelty, the creation of a ‘standing corps’ under the new Frontex regulation is 
also ongoing. Contrary to the previously described responsibility system, this creates 
a  new situation. The statutory and long-term seconded staff will be responsible only 
towards Frontex, while the system of dual responsibility remains during the deployment 
of the short-term seconded staff and the reserve for rapid reaction.18
4. Implications for Frontex
Such events and the strengthening role of Frontex raises serious concerns about how 
the current border management system is prepared to cope with fundamental legal 
challenges. Given the rigidity of political process concerning the reform of primary law 
of the EU, it shall be clarified whether this intensified border protection gives more 
14 Regulation (EU)  2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Cuncil of  13 November  2019 on the European Bor-
der and Coast Guard. Official Journal of the European Union. Available: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896&from=HU (25. 11. 2020.)
15 Mikael Cederbratt, ‘Frontex: human rights responsibilities’, Parliamentary Assembly,  2013.  Available: https://as-
sembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=19547&lang=en (25. 11. 2020.)
16 Regulation (EU)  2019/1896,  1.
17 ‘Vít and Kemény, ‘External EU Border Protection’.
18 Ibid.
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power to Member States and weakens the position of EU institutions. If the answer is 
yes, the current legal framework of Frontex is hardly sustainable. Referring to the above 
mentioned Danish incident, decision makers and operational staff shall pay attention to 
the mandate of Frontex and of its missions. This implies that Frontex operations must be 
in harmony with fundamental rights, as is it interpreted by EU institutions and agencies. 
Therefore, the Frontex is in a  schizophrenic position of defending two EU interests: 
the emerging need to provide security, or to respect rule of law. The Danish case draws 
attention to the significant gap between what Frontex and seconded officers shall do, 
and how it is supposed to be implemented. The official statement of the agency19 and the 
Frontex regulation,20 which emphasise the importance of respecting fundamental rights, 
does not really influence the situation on the field.21
Beside the previously described political and legal dimensions, the border management 
has also an operational dimension, which derives from the fact that Frontex is composed 
as an intergovernmental organisation as it mostly operates with the resources of Member 
States. Coming from this, Frontex has only limited capacity and resources to implement 
security measures in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights22 of the EU.23
Acknowledging the legitimacy of this statement the concerns are raised in relation 
to the deployed staff who has dual responsibility and accountability described in the 
previous section. While these police officers work under the limited command and 
control of Frontex, they have been heavily influenced by the organisational culture and 
values of their sending country, which has an impact on their attitude towards respect for 
fundamental rights. As we learnt from the Danish case, the measures that Danish officers 
considered to be a clear violation of the fundamental rights were executed by the police 
officers coming from other Member States. The authors argue that this phenomenon will 
not disappear with the creation of the ‘standing corps’, as still only a small number of the 
deployed staff will have sole responsibility towards Frontex, while the other officers will 
act and operate under the structure of dual responsibility and accountability.24
5. Operation outside EU territory
Frontex operations outside the EU raise even more fundamental questions about 
legality and efficiency. Frontex shall present and protect EU norms, legislation and 
values in a  territory where the legal framework is only vaguely harmonised with the 
EU standards and best practices. This means that Frontex is given a political mandate 
19 Ska Keller, ‘New rules on Frontex operations at sea’. LIBE Special, April  2014.  Available: www.statewatch.org/
news/2014/apr/ep-green-keler-mep-frontex-operations-at-sea.pdf (25. 11. 2020.)
20 Regulation (EU)  2019/1896, para  80.
21 ‘Vít and Kemény, ‘External EU Border Protection’.
22 Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union (2000/C  364/01), Official Journal of the European Communities, 
 2000. Available: www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf (25. 11. 2020.)
23 ‘Vít and Kemény, ‘External EU Border Protection’.
24 Ibid.
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that is impossible to be implemented, as Frontex assistance missions – for instance in 
the Western Balkans – would be conducted in a certain legal vacuum.25 This sends very 
blurred message towards the Frontex missions. The question may arise as a legitimate 
one: The operation in third country is an EU capacity building instrument, which provides 
efficient and needed assistance for the border police services, or rather the instrument of 
Member States in order to have their ‘agents on spots’ when fulfilling the mission?
6. Conclusions
Various interpretations of the fundamental rights and legislation, differences in 
organisational culture and values result in different and contradictory police measures 
in the border area. In this context, a further nationalising of Frontex’s institutional 
culture is the most probable result of similar events. It means that, hand in hand with 
growing incidents like in February/March  2020 on the Greek–Turkish border causing an 
increased number of people aiming to enter the EU irregularly, the Frontex agency will 
experience further tensions on both institutional and operational level mostly coming 
from the different organisational culture. This significantly jeopardises the functionality 
and the success of the operations, the security of the EU and its Member States, and 
therefore may question the need for further EU support from the requesting country. As 
stated above, since Member States and their cooperation is crucial for border protection, 
the role of the agency being an  EU agency might be questioned in terms of moving 
responsibility as well as power to Member States.
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ABSZTRAKT
Ellentmondások a Frontex műveletekben: a push-back (Visszaszorítás)
Michal VÍT — KEMÉNY Gábor
A tanulmány célja az  Európai Unió és  az  Európa Tanács által deklarált alapjogok és  normák 
alkalmazása során felmerülő visszásságok bemutatása. A  cikk ezt a  görög–török határon 
foganatosított visszaszorítást (push-back) lehetővé tevő és megakadályozó tényezők, így az eltérő 
jogértelmezés, szervezeti kultúra és  értékrendek bemutatásán keresztül kívánja elérni. A  cikk 
szerzői arra a következtetésre jutottak, hogy a fenti tényezők jelentősen veszélyeztetik az alapvető 
emberi jogok érvényesülését, valamint negatívan befolyásolják a határigazgatás eredményességét 
és ezáltal az EU és tagállamai biztonságát.
Kulcsszavak: alapjogok, rendőrségi együttműködés, határőrség, információcsere, Dánia, 
Görögország, EU-jog
